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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The success of Airbus Industrie in challenging Boeing’s dominant position in the 
highly competitive civil airliner market has been widely reported. In the light of this 
success this paper reviews the progress made by the European aerospace industry in 
the last three decades of the twentieth century. In particular the position of Europe in 
relation to the US aerospace industry is analysed. As well as covering civil airliner 
production the study also considers the space and aero engine sectors. In order to 
explore the factors that have led to a European challenge, three organisations, each 
from different sectors of the industry, are analysed. The paper concludes that there has 
been a revival in the fortunes of the industry and its position within the world 
aerospace industry.   
 
 
Keywords 
Aerospace industry, collaboration, change, industry structure, performance and joint 
ventures
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EUROPEAN RETROSPECTIVE: THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRY 1970-2000 
 
 
INITRODUCTION 
 
Aerospace is an industry of the twentieth century.  It had its origins in the first decade 
of the century.  By the middle of the century it was the biggest industry in the US, the 
world’s biggest economy.  In the second half of the century the growth of commercial 
aviation helped bring about one of the biggest changes in business - the spread of 
globalisation. 
 
While many of the leading technological innovations in the aerospace industry, such 
as the jet engine
1
 and the swept wing
2
 were developed in Europe, when it came to 
applying the technology and the development of commercially viable products, it was 
the Americans who led.  By the late 1960s the US had in Hayward
3
 words ‘established 
a stranglehold over most of the market sectors’.  In the closing years of the century, 
several commentators highlighted an emerging challenge from Europe.  In the 1980s 
Yoshino
4
 noted a challenge to Boeing’s domination of the commercial airliner market 
coming from Europe.  In the 1990s Heppenheimer
5
, in a history of commercial 
aviation, devoted an entire chapter to what he termed the ‘European Renaissance’. 
 
It is developments in the European aerospace industry, that have led commentators to 
talk about a European revival and a European challenge to US dominance of the 
world’s aerospace industry, that this paper seeks to analyse.  It endeavours to use the 
vantage point of the start of the second aerospace century to reflect upon and take 
stock of the progress of the European aerospace industry over the last 30 years. The 
position of the European aerospace industry within the global aerospace market and in 
relation to its counterpart in the US is also explored.  In the process, the changes that 
have taken place in the structure of the European aerospace industry are reviewed. 
Despite the high public profile of the European Airbus consortium
6
, the study is not 
confined to commercial airliners where a European revival has been most in evidence.  
Rather the study endeavours to gauge progress across the industry, including the 
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engine and space sectors.  To this end the progress made by three European aerospace 
organisations, each from a different sector of the industry, is examined. This provides 
an opportunity to explore the extent of the European revival and the factors that have 
brought it about. 
 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY IN 1970 
 
In the 1960s the process of integrating Europe’s aerospace interests was in its infancy.  
The leading aerospace companies in Britain, France, Germany and Italy,  were largely 
separate unconnected entities and the concept of a ‘European’ aerospace industry was 
relatively new.  The need for some form of integration was highlighted by the 
disparity in the scale of aerospace activities between Europe and the US.  As figure 1 
clearly shows, in the 1970s even when the turnover of the leading European aerospace 
nations was combined, the total was still dwarfed by the US.  In 1970 the turnover of 
the US aerospace industry at 22.3 billion ecu was almost six times Europe’s turnover 
of 4.0 billion ecu
7
. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Nor were differences between Europe and the US confined to scale in 1970.  The 
structure of the two aerospace industries also differed.  Table 1 highlights differences 
in the relative size of the various sectors.  The biggest difference between Europe and 
the US was in the space sector.  Table 1 shows that in 1970 the space sector in the US 
was ten times the size of the space sector in Europe.  With just 3.2 per cent of 
turnover, Europe’s space sector was underdeveloped.  In the US it formed a major 
element of the aerospace industry.  This reflected the political importance of NASA 
and the Apollo programme.  Some countries, principally France and Britain, had 
companies undertaking work in the space field, but the scale of work was small. 
Attempts at cooperation between European countries, such as the ELDO satellite 
launcher had proved a failure. As a result space comprised only a small proportion of 
the industry’s turnover.   
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Insert Table 1 
 
The differences were not confined to the space sector.  Table 2 shows that the 
aeronautical part of the European aerospace industry, that is to say the non-space part, 
was much more dependent on the state than in the US.  58.3 per cent of aeronautical 
work in Europe was for the state while in the US the equivalent proportion was 51.5 
per cent. The difference lay in the civil market.  Table 2 shows that in the aircraft 
sector Europe had half the proportion of civil work of the US, the proportions being 
8.4 per cent and 19.4 per cent.  It was a similar story in the engine sector where the 
proportions were 9.0 per cent and 23.1 per cent. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
In the aircraft and engine sectors in the US, commercial work for the civil sector was 
well developed, helped in no small measure by the size of the US domestic market
8
.  
American manufacturers dominated the civil airliner market.  Between them they had 
90 per cent of the market for civil aircraft by the mid 1970s
9
.  In the engine sector US 
dominance was even more marked with a single firm, Pratt and Whitney having more 
than 90 per cent of the world market for civil jet engines
10
.  European aircraft and 
engine manufacturers in contrast were much more dependent on the state as a major 
customer. Figure 2 shows that as late as 1980 military work still comprised two thirds 
of the European aerospace industry’s turnover. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
Although comparable to the US in terms of the proportion of turnover going into 
exports (table 2), its weak position in the civil market, meant Europe had a high level 
of aerospace imports. Civil airliners, particularly long haul ones formed a very large 
part of this figure. This was evident in Europe’s balance of aerospace trade during the 
1970s. Between 1968 and 1973 Europe showed a deficit balance of aerospace trade 
amounting to $4.5 billion
11
.   
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The US aerospace industry was also more efficient.  Table 3 shows that in 1970 the 
US produced six times the turnover with a workforce that was only three times the 
size.  Europe’s poor productivity reflected the production of a large number of aircraft 
types that sold in relatively small numbers
12
.  By 1974 the US aerospace industry had 
produced four types of airliner with sales in excess of 600, the point at which airliner 
programmes usually break even
13
.  While only one European airliner, the Sud 
Aviation Caravelle, had sold more than 250.  These poor results were a reflection of 
European aerospace manufacturers serving their own national market where 
commercial aviation was regulated and dominated by the state as a purchaser. As 
Muller
14
 has pointed out, until the end of the 1960s in Europe, ‘the choice of products 
manufactured and the nomination of industry leaders were all very largely in the hands 
of their respective governments’. A consequence of targeting national markets was 
that European airliners were poorly suited to the needs of the world’s airlines, 
especially US airlines serving the US domestic market which in the 1970s amounted 
to 35-40 per cent of global aerospace sales
15
.  There were one or two bright spots.  In 
the turboprop airliner market Fokker achieved 500 + sales of its F27 model in the 
1970s, while in the executive jet market the ratio of European to US sales was one to 
two. The success of small European airliners like the F27 was reflected in Europe’s 
share of the world market for short haul airliners that in 1975 stood at 13.7 per cent, 
compared to a 2.7 per cent share of the long haul airliner market
16
. Despite this, the 
civil airliner market of the 1970s was clearly dominated by the US.   
 
Insert Table 3 
 
30 YEARS ON 
 
Figure 1 shows that in terms of turnover, the European aerospace industry has grown 
substantially over the last thirty years.  The rate of growth has been much steadier than 
in the US where expansion has been more rapid and contraction more severe and more 
prolonged, reflecting the combined impact of the Reagan defence build-up and de-
regulation of civil aviation of the 1980s.  When measured in real terms the contrast 
with the US becomes starker. Whereas the turnover of the US aerospace industry 
increased by 5.8 per cent in real terms over the fifteen years between 1980 and 1995, 
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the turnover of the European aerospace industry increased by 28.8 per cent
17
. The 
effect of Europe’s growth has been to narrow the gap between the European aerospace 
industry and its US counterpart to the point where at the start of the new century, the 
former, with a turnover of 62.2 billion ecu was two thirds the size of the latter with a 
turnover of 104.4 billion ecu
18
. 
 
An increase in the scale of activity, as measured by turnover was not accompanied by 
growth in the size of the workforce. Employment in the industry fell during the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s. As a result there was a significant improvement in efficiency. 
Sales per employee which in 1980 stood at 65,400 ecu had risen to 147,500 ecu by 
1988
19
. This level of efficiency rivalled that achieved in the US where sales per 
employee in 1998 stood at 170,700ecu. 
 
There was a similar improvement in the aerospace balance of trade. From being 
massively in deficit in the 1970s, the balance became neutral for much of the 1980s 
and as the industry came out of recession in the early 1990s, Europe’s aerospace trade 
balance swung into surplus.  
 
Alongside the increase in the size of the European aerospace industry and an 
improvement in performance came a big change in the customer base. Figure 2 shows 
that the proportion of military to civil work, which in 1980 stood at two thirds to one 
third, steadily declined during the 1980s. By the end of the decade the proportions 
were equal. During the 1990s, with the ending of the Cold War and continued growth 
in air travel, the proportion of military work continued to decline, until by the end of 
the 1990s the proportion of military work was down to one third. These changes were 
reflected in the aerospace industries of individual countries. France with 32 per cent of 
its turnover generated from civil work in 1982 had 52 per cent civil turnover by 
1991
20
. Similarly Germany with 30 per cent of its employees engaged in civil work in 
1970, saw this rise to 70 per cent by 1995. 
 
 The change in the proportion of civil/military sales reflects changes in the structure of 
the European aerospace industry, in terms of the importance of the sectors that make 
up the industry.  Three organisations drawn from the sectors where major changes 
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have occurred are now examined in order to highlight the changes and the factors that 
have brought them about. 
 
 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
 
Airbus Industrie 
 
The growth of civil airliner manufacturing in Europe centres upon the Airbus 
programme.  Formed in 1970 as a three nation consortium which Britain joined in 
1979, thirty years later Airbus Industrie was challenging Boeing, the American market 
leader. 
 
Figure 3 shows that Airbus made a comparatively slow start.  Its first airliner, the 
wide-bodied, twin-jet A300 entered service in 1974, but by 1980 its total sales still 
only amounted to 292.  The 1980s saw a major step forward as the consortium 
introduced the single aisle A320 that entered service in 1988.  But by 1991 total 
Airbus deliveries still only came to 650
21
 the point at which individual airliner 
programmes generally became profitable.  The comparatively low level of Airbus 
output reflected the consortium’s modest progress in the 1980s.  However, the Airbus 
order book signalled that the new decade was to see a change in Europe’s position 
within the world airliner market.  With more than 1,000 aircraft on order valued at 
$71 billion
22
, Airbus had a market share of almost one third and significantly had 
pushed McDonnell-Douglas, once the world’s leading producer of commercial 
aircraft
23
, into third place. 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
As the world’s airlines came out of recession in the early 1990s, Airbus was able to 
close the gap (figure 3) between itself and its rival, Boeing.  It was helped by the 
breadth of its product range.  In only one market segment, wide-bodied jets with 400+ 
seats, did it not compete with Boeing.  As the decade drew to a close Airbus narrowed 
the gap still further.  By 1999 Airbus was on equal terms.  With 476 orders to 
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Boeing’s 391 in 1999, Airbus outsold its American rival (figure 3).  It was a similar 
story with regard to the backlog of orders, where by the end of 1999 Airbus had 50 per 
cent of the total.  In the same year the consortium delivered its 1000th A320 narrow-
bodied jet.  This airliner in its various forms has proved highly successful since 
production had been running for barely ten years.  Furthermore, as table 4 makes 
clear, Airbus had achieved a high level of market penetration in the US.  Given that 
the US had dominated the civil airliner market in the 1970s with a market share in 
excess of 90 per cent, the A320 had the unusual distinction, for a European aircraft, of 
having sold in greater numbers in the US than in Europe.  Table 4 also reveals that by 
1999 all three of Airbus’s major airliner programmes, had, or were about to achieve, 
sales in excess of 600. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
While the success of Airbus in challenging US dominance in the civil airliner market 
has been well publicised, the factors that have enabled the consortium to reach this 
position are perhaps less well known. Collaboration has been important. It lies at the 
heart of the success of Airbus Industrie in establishing itself as a major player in the 
civil airliner market. None of the major European aerospace manufacturers could have 
undertaken the development of the Airbus product range independently. Collaboration 
not only helped to provide the necessary resources, it also provided a large home 
market, that came close to matching that enjoyed by US manufacturers. However it 
would be wrong to see the success of Airbus solely in terms of the benefits of 
collaboration. Other features of the approach taken by Airbus have been important.  
 
The Airbus consortium has enjoyed a very high level of political support. It has been 
the dominant aerospace programme in Europe over the last 30 years. As such it has 
enjoyed both financial and political support from European governments. Other 
collaborative aerospace programmes in Europe, most notably Concorde, have been 
supported in a similar manner but have not shared the success enjoyed by Airbus, 
suggesting there are other aspects of the Airbus approach that help to account for its 
success. A succinct summary of these other aspects is provided by Thornton
24
 when 
he notes, 
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‘the overriding political priority of ending American hegemony in a crucial 
economic sector was thus realized through technological expertise and 
commercial savvy.’  
 
Reliance on technological expertise has not always been part of the Airbus approach. 
The first Airbus was ‘technologically conservative’25. This was quite deliberate since 
the consortium members reasoned that such conservatism was likely to be attractive 
for a product from a new and unproven undertaking. Nonetheless the A300 was 
innovative. The twin engine design differentiated the airliner from its three engined 
American rivals. With only two engines, the A300 offered the airlines the prospect of 
lower costs. 
 
Anxious to differentiate its new single-aisle airliner in a similar manner in the early 
1980s, ‘Airbus took a technological leap’26 with the A320. The A320 was the first 
civil airliner equiped with fly-by-wire technology. Though some leading industry 
figures
27
 doubted the wisdom of employing the this new technology, unproven in 
commercial passenger carrying applications, nonetheless it offered considerable 
potential benefits. Without the need for mechanical controls, fly-by-wire technology 
offered substantial benefits in terms of weight reduction. For airlines this meant lower 
operating costs. Allied to computerised ‘glass cockpit’ systems, fly-by-wire also 
offered further benefits in terms of two person crews (instead of the normal three) and 
commonality between different models, with consequent reductions in training and 
operating costs. 
 
In contrast to Airbus’s bold strategy involving the use of technology to provide 
competitive advantage, McDonnell-Douglas took what at the time was the easier and 
less risky option. With two proven airliners that were selling well, the DC9 and DC10, 
McDonnell-Douglas opted in the 1980s for the cheaper and less risky strategy of 
developing derivative products. Although this worked well in the short term, over 
time the more technologically advanced Airbus designs eventually outsold them. As a 
result, McDonnell-Douglas slipped into third place in the civil airliner market and was 
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acquired by Boeing in 1996. For its part, Boeing did not embrace the new fly-by-wire 
technology until the 1990s when it developed the Boeing 777. 
 
While it was a big gamble, the introduction of fly-by-wire technology was clearly a 
case of ‘wresting of the technological initiative from the industry’s dominant 
players’28. But it was not a case of technological advance purely for the sake of  
technological leadership as was the case with Concorde. The use of fly-by-wire 
technology clearly fitted within the consortium’s overall strategy. It served to 
differentiate the A320 from its two well established rivals. The differentiation was 
linked to commercial factors, namely lower operating costs and increased flexibility. 
Hence the decision to go for fly-by-wire technology was in fact an example of 
‘commercial savy’ on the part of the consortium. 
 
The adoption of a strong commercial orientation or as Muller
29
 describes it, ‘a switch 
to commercial logic’, was a feature of the Airbus consortium from the outset.  It 
involved endeavouring wherever possible to meet the needs of customers by ‘offering 
airliners that people actually wanted to buy’30. The demands of the market dictated the 
characteristics of the aircraft
31
 and this was supported by aggressive marketing along 
the lines of its American competitors
32
. This contrasts with the approach used by 
European aerospace manufacturers working independently where the approach had in 
the past been one of developing a new airliner and then persuading the airlines to buy 
it or developing an airliner for the national airline with little appeal in the wider 
market.  
 
A key feature of Airbus Industrie’s  more commercial approach to aerospace was the 
recognition of the advantages inherent in offering not a single airliner but a full line 
comprising a ‘family’ of airliners. Thus the first Airbus the A300, was followed by the 
A320 launched in 1983 and the A330/340 launched in 1989. Each series has involved 
derivatives, so that by 1999 the Airbus family amounted to eight members. For the  
airlines, a family of airliners meant lower unit costs in terms of equipment, 
maintenance and pilot training
33
. For the consortium, a family meant that Airbus could 
match Boeing’s product range in every market segment, except very large airliners 
where Boeing retained a monopoly.  
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Arianespace 
 
The very low level of activity in the space sector in 1975 (table 1) reflected the fact 
that space, until the 1980s was the preserve of superpowers like the US
34
.  Even the 
formation of the European Space Agency (ESA) in the 1970s did little to correct the 
situation.  During the 1980s Europe began to make in-roads in the satellite field taking 
about one fifth of the market
35.  The 1990s saw further progress as Europe’s share 
rose to almost a quarter. 
 
In one major part of the space sector, satellite launchers, the 1990s saw Europe make 
big strides. Arianespace, the organisation that took over operational responsibility for 
the European Space Agency’s Ariane launcher36, was set up in 1980. It comprised a 
consortium of European banks and industrial firms and was specifically charged with 
overseeing the commercial exploitation of the launcher.  When the satellite launching 
capability of the US was seriously undermined by the Challenger disaster of 1986
37
, 
Arianespace was well placed to exploit the growth in commercial telecommunications 
satellites that followed the de-regulation of telecommunications markets in the 1990s.  
In 1990 Arianespace took one half of the market for commercial satellite launches
38
.  
As the decade proceeded Arianespace’s market share increased.  Over the period 
1990-95 the company dominated the market for launching telecommunications 
satellites into geostationary orbit with a two thirds market share. 
 
As with civil airliners, European expansion in the space sector was the result of a 
collaborative approach.  Like Airbus Industrie, Arianespace involves international 
collaboration, the main participants being France and Germany.  Again like Airbus 
Industrie the collaboration is between commercial concerns.  The similarities do not 
end there for Arianespace’s success has been exploiting the commercial potential of 
the Ariane launcher. 
 
Rolls-Royce 
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While the more dramatic changes in the structure of the European aerospace industry 
have occurred in the aircraft and space sectors, there have also been important 
developments in the engine sector. From a situation where in the 1970s they were 
primarily manufacturers of military engines, two of Europe’s engine makers have 
become a major force in the civil aero engine market. Just how these changes have 
come about is explored through an examination of the progress made by the British 
aero engine manufacturer, Rolls-Royce. 
  
Although the development of the jet engine was pioneered by two European concerns, 
BMW in Germany and Rolls-Royce in Britain, by the late 1960s the market for 
commercial engines was dominated by Pratt and Whitney of the US.  In the early 
1970s there were many companies engaged in aero engine manufacturing spread 
across Europe, including Snecma and Turbomeca in France, MTU in Germany, Fiat 
and Alfa Romeo in Italy and Volvo Flygmotor in Sweden.  But only one European 
company, Britain’s Rolls-Royce, had the capability to design and develop jet engines 
for use in both military and civil sectors
39
.  The others were active in the military 
sector, but largely through manufacturing engines under licence. 
 
For its part, Rolls-Royce was in poor shape in the early 1970s.  Severe financial 
problems had forced it into public ownership in 1971.  Figure 4 shows that even by 
the late 1970s it was the smallest of the world’s ‘Big Three’ aero engine producers.  
Over the period 1976 to 1985 the company’s market share averaged 13 per cent40. A 
major factor behind this poor performance was the very limited scope of the 
company’s product range.  Although it had developed the high thrust RB-211 engine 
in the early 1970s in order to provide access to the developing market for wide-bodied 
aircraft, Rolls-Royce suffered from its commitment to the commercially unsuccessful 
Lockheed L-1011
41.  The limited nature of the company’s product range is illustrated 
by the fact that in 1980 Rolls-Royce engines had applications on only four civil 
aircraft
42
. Inevitably this made it difficult for the company to expand its market share.  
 
In order to broaden its product range and thereby offer an increased range of airframe 
applications, Rolls-Royce turned during the 1970s to the development of derivative 
engines.  Based on the core of the RB211, the 524 engine which entered service in 
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1977 was a more powerful engine targeted at Boeing 747 applications. It was followed 
by the de-rated 535 engine for narrow-bodied airliners which entered service in 1983. 
Both engines shared the advanced technology features of the RB211, centred on two 
innovations, a three shaft configuration that was lighter and more easily maintained 
than conventional two shaft designs and a wide chord fan offering ‘outstanding fuel 
efficiency’43. In the 1980s, Rolls-Royce developed another derivative engine, the Tay. 
This time some of the advanced technology features of the RB211 programme were 
applied to a completely different and much smaller engine. Transferring technology in 
this way again produced an engine that was quieter, more fuel efficient and more 
reliable
44
, characteristics that appealed to the company’s airline customers.   
 
Although Rolls-Royce’s ‘derivative approach’45 of applying advanced technology 
developed as part of one engine programme to other engines, made a major 
contribution to extending the company’s product portfolio  in terms of civil airliner 
applications, some market segments, especially newly emerging segments,  demanded 
an entirely new engine.  To develop products for these segments the company turned, 
during the 1980s, to international collaborative agreements. In 1983 the company 
established a joint venture with Pratt and Whitney of the US, the European engine 
producers MTU and Fiat and a Japanese consortium, to develop a new ‘10 tonne’ 
engine, the V2500. It was a competitor for the successful CFM56 engine produced by 
the Snecma-General Electric joint venture, CFM-International. Two further equity 
joint ventures established in the late 1980s to enable the company to tap new market 
segments were Williams-Rolls Inc., a joint venture with Williams International, the 
American manufacturer of small jet engines, set up to produce the FJ44 engine for a 
new class of small business jets, such as the Citationjet
46
 and BMW Rolls-Royce 
GmbH a joint venture with the German car manufacturer BMW to develop an entirely 
new engine to power a new generation of regional jets. 
 
These three joint ventures formed the next stage in the company’s strategy of 
broadening its product range to increase the number of aircraft applications and boost 
its share of the world market for commercial jet engines. Though they involved a 
different mode of operation and were associated with the development of entirely new 
engines, Rolls-Royce’s equity joint ventures continued the practice of transferring 
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technologies from one engine programme to another. The V2500 and BR700 engines 
for instance use the wide chord fan originally developed for the RB211 family
47
. The 
use of equity joint ventures also fitted Rolls-Royce’s strategy of increasing 
commercialisation. The company had made use of joint ventures before, but in the 
past they had formed part of inter-governmental agreements. As ‘project-based joint 
ventures’48, they were little more than co-production agreements for the supply of 
military engines. The equity joint ventures that Rolls-Royce entered into in the 1990s 
were driven by commercial rather than political motives. As autonomous commercial 
entities they not only make engines but market them and provide product support as 
well. Such is their autonomy that their products sometimes compete in the 
marketplace with the products of their parent company.  The move to equity joint 
ventures fitted in with a broader process of commercialisation that saw the company 
privatised in 1987.  The process of commercialisation also saw a major drive to 
improve productivity with the company shedding almost one third of its workforce 
over a six year period during the 1980s
49
. 
 
In the 1990s Rolls-Royce broadened its product range still further, but this time by 
quite different means, namely through acquisition. In 1995 the company acquired 
Allison, the American engine manufacturer. Allison had for many years been a 
subsidiary of the US car manufacturer, General Motors. Through the acquisition 
Rolls-Royce gained access to the rapidly growing market for engines to power small 
regional jets. Allison’s newly developed AE3007 engine proved extremely popular 
with regional jet manufacturers like Embraer, whose RJ145 regional jet proved a 
market leader in the late 1990s.  
 
Reviewing the company’s progress in 1997, Rolls-Royce’s chief executive, John 
Rose, commented ‘we are now doing more business than we could have thought 
possible ten years ago’50.  This statement highlights the step change in the company’s 
fortunes that had occurred during the 1990s. Figure 4 shows that after the recession of 
the early 1990s, aerospace turnover rose steadily after 1994, standing at almost $6 
billion by the end of the decade.  This rise was matched by a steady increase in market 
share.  As late as 1987 when the company was privatised, Rolls-Royce’s market share 
was still only 12 per cent. But by 1990 market share had risen to 20 per cent. From 
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this point it climbed rapidly. By 1997 the company’s overall market share had reached 
34 per cent
51
. As its market share rose to one third, so Pratt and Whitney, the one time 
market leader was pushed into third place.  
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
Thus by the start of the twenty-first century Rolls-Royce was a very different company 
from thirty years earlier. It had retained its capability to design and develop both 
military and civil engines. It was no longer heavily dependent on the UK government 
for orders. It could now claim to be a ‘full line’ engine manufacturer with a product 
portfolio that stretched from engines that powered the smallest business jets to the 
largest wide-bodied airliners. There were few market segments where it did not have a 
major presence. More significantly it was now on equal terms with its American 
rivals.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Analysis of these three European aerospace organisations reveals that the European 
revival is by no means confined to the civil aircraft sector. Airbus may be the best 
known example of Europe’s recent success in the aerospace field, but it is by no 
means the only one. Arianespace has become a major presence in the Space sector and 
Rolls-Royce has seen a revival in its fortunes. Growth has occurred across all the 
sectors of the European aerospace industry. The scale of the structural change is such 
that one can genuinely describe what has taken place not just as a European revival 
but a European renaissance. 
 
How has this renaissance come about? Reviewing the leading European players in 
each sector of the aerospace industry reveals three major features of their competitive 
strategies. International collaboration features prominently in the competitive 
strategies of organisations in all three sectors. International collaboration has been a 
major feature of the changes that have occurred in all three sectors. International 
collaboration has been enormously helpful in getting round one of the key problems 
facing European firms in the 1960s and 1970s – a lack of demand brought about by 
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focussing on national rather than international markets. But there has been a big 
change in the nature of the collaboration. There has been a move away from what 
Muller
52
 describes as ‘alliances imposed by government’.  The equity joint ventures to 
have emerged in the space and engine sectors owe little to government. They are 
commercial ventures designed to enable the participants to tap specific markets. They 
have a high level of autonomy and they are market-oriented. The Airbus consortium, 
while not a conventional equity joint venture has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy 
and the agreement of the partners to form Airbus Integrated Company
53
 meant that by 
2001, Airbus was operating as a conventional commercial undertaking.   
 
Technology also features in the competitive strategies of European aerospace 
companies. For Airbus it was computer technology associated with fly-by-wire 
systems, while for Rolls-Royce it was wide chord fan technology. A common feature 
of the approach taken by European aerospace firms was the emphasis on the 
application of technology rather than the technology itself. Both Airbus and Rolls-
Royce used technology to provide their products with competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. Hence technology was used  to enhance products so as to provide 
commercial customers, namely airlines, with significant benefits, for which they 
would be willing to pay. The commercial application of technology is closely linked 
to the third feature of the competitive strategies seen in Europe, namely a much more 
commercial approach to aerospace. The most obvious instance of commercialisation 
is the way the civil market has been targeted in all three sectors. More specific 
manifestations would include the Airbus policy of developing a family of airliners 
designed to offer major benefits to the airlines in terms of lower costs associated with 
staffing, training and maintenance and Arianespace’s policy of ordering batches of 
launchers in order to gain volume discounts. While at Rolls-Royce commercialisation 
has taken many forms including extending the product portfolio, the ‘derivative 
approach’ to engine development, lowering the headcount and pursuing market share. 
Thus a more commercial approach or, as Muller
54
 describes it, ‘market-led logic’, is 
very much in evidence right across the industry. 
  
While collaboration, technology and commercialisation have been utilised by 
European aerospace organisations to enable them to compete effectively, these same 
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organisations have been helped by major changes in the commercial environment over 
the last 30 years. Sharply increased fuel prices in the early 1980s
55
 had a major impact 
on the airlines
56
. As a result fuel efficiency became a more important factor in airline 
procurement decisions.  This was a major strength of Rolls-Royce’s new RB-211 
derived engines and afforded the company an important competitive advantage, 
particularly in the market for wide-bodied, long haul aircraft. It also helped Airbus 
because the twin-engine A300 was cheaper to operate than its three-engine American 
rivals. The 1980s also saw the airlines becoming much more price sensitive in 
procurement decisions as airline de-regulation in the US unleashed a period of intense 
price competition.  Price competition over fares made US airlines much more aware 
of the value of lowering operating costs
57,58
.  This in turn made them more willing 
than in the past to consider buying foreign products. A third change in the commercial 
environment that helped Europe increase its market share was the rise of rapidly 
expanding markets particularly in South East Asia
59
.  In these new rising markets 
there was less loyalty to US aerospace manufacturers. Thus both Airbus and Rolls-
Royce pursued the ‘Silk Road’60 winning major orders in South East Asia. By 1996 all 
the new Boeing 777 twin jets sold in South East Asia were Rolls-Royce powered
61
. 
 
These changes in the commercial environment over the last thirty years have not so 
much undermined the position of dominant US firms, as reduced the barriers to entry 
that in the 1970s made it very difficult for European manufacturers to compete on 
equal terms. The new commercial environment enabled the newcomers to establish a 
bridgehead, upon which they then capitalised using competitive strategies involving 
international collaboration, technology and a more commercial approach to aerospace.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When the European aerospace industry of the 1990s is compared to its counterpart of 
the 1970s it becomes clear that there has indeed been a European revival.  Whether 
measured in real terms or in relation to its competitors the industry is bigger and 
healthier.  In size terms, the industry has seen growth in turnover, while in health 
terms the industry has turned a trade deficit in aerospace in the 1970s into a 
substantial surplus in the 1990s. 
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Given the high public profile of Airbus Industrie and its widely reported battles with 
market leader Boeing
62
, a European revival could well have been anticipated. What is 
surprising however is that, as this paper makes clear, the revival extends well beyond 
the manufacture of civil airliners. There has been a significant growth in the space 
sector with Arianespace taking a large share of the market for satellite launchers. 
Similarly European firms, in the form of Rolls-Royce and Snecma, have made major 
inroads in the civil aero engine market, a sector once dominated by the US.  
  
What is also clear from the analysis is that although many of the policies that have 
brought about a turnaround in Europe’s fortunes were implemented in the 1970s and 
1980s, it was not until the 1990s that European aerospace really came to prominence 
in the world aerospace market. Some important changes took place in the 1980s, but 
in terms of markets, the really big changes did not occur until the 1990s. In all three 
sectors, civil airliners, aero engines and satellite launchers, it is the 1990s that stand 
out as a period when a serious challenge to US pre-eminence emerged.  
 
Because the 1990s differ markedly from earlier decades, this suggests that a re-
appraisal of the world aerospace industry, and the place of Europe within it, is 
overdue. If major strategic changes could be identified in the early 1990s
63,64
, 
reviewing the whole decade leads to the conclusion that Europe’s position within the 
world aerospace industry has changed in recent years and that there has been a 
European renaissance. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Aerospace Industry Turnover by Sector (1972/3) 
 
Sector EU (%) US (%) 
Aircraft  54.2  43.5 
Engines  25.1  13.0 
Equipment  17.5  15.3 
Space    3.2  28.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   
Source: ECC (1975) Action programme for the European aeronautical sector, European Commission, 
Brussels 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Aeronautical Turnover by Customer Category (%) 
 
 Aircraft Engines Equipment Total 
EU     
State  57.7  61.3  56.1  58.3 
Civil Market (domestic)   8.4   9.0  24.0  11.4 
Exports  33.9  29.7  19.9  30.3 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
US     
State  45.6   52.3  67.5  51.5 
Civil Market (domestic)  19.4  23.1  23.5  20.9 
Exports  35.0  24.6    9.0  27.6 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Source: ECC (1975) Action programme for the European aeronautical sector, European Commission, 
Brussels 
 
Table 3 
Employment in the Aerospace Industry (1970-98) 
 
Country 1970 1998 
 
EU    438,770 422,484 
US 1,166,000 612,000 
Canada      35,800   66,870 
Japan      25,600   34,761 
   
Source: ECC (1975) Action programme for the European aeronautical sector, European Commission, 
Brussels; AECMA (1999) The European Aerospace Industry: 1998 Statistical Survey, 
European Association of Aerospace Industries, Brussels. 
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Table 4 
Airbus Orders by Region 1970-1999 
 
 A300/310 A320 A330/340 Total 
Europe 213    616 177 1,006 
N.America 210    847 126 1,183 
Asia 232    242 141    615 
Other 120    199 129    448 
Total 775 1,909 573 3,252 
     
Source: Allport, D, (1999) ‘Airbus Industrie’ Air International, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp i-xvi 
 
 
Figure1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (1996) The European Aerospace Industry 1996: Trading Position and 
Figures, European Commission, Brussels; AECMA (1999) The European Aerospace 
Industry: 1998 Statistical Survey, European Association of Aerospace Industries, Brussels. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AECMA (1999) The European Aerospace Industry: 1998 Statistical Survey, European 
Association of Aerospace Industries, Brussels. 
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Source: European Commission (1996) The European Aerospace Industry 1996: Trading Position and 
Figures, European Commission, Brussels; Allport, D, (1999) ‘Airbus Industrie’ Air International, Vol. 
56, No. 6, pp i-xvi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (1996) The European Aerospace Industry 1996: Trading Position and 
Figures, European Commission, Brussels; Company Reports. 
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